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The Politics of Religious Establishment: Recognition of Muslim
Marriages in South Africa
Peter G. Danchin*
In making the (false) assumption of the reconciliation of the individual or community
with the reason of the law, the [South African] Constitution arrives at the metaphor of
Western metaphysics, logos reconciled with nomos …. In the metaphor of
logonomocentrism, ‘the claim of the unity of self and others in absolute reason of the
law’ is made. Logonomocentrism promises the truth of reason and the reason of law,
which are both games of figurality and rhetoricity. If, however, there is asymmetry
between the practices of religious persons and the reasons of the state (nomos), then
the only way logonomocentrism deals with these relations is to ‘other’ and
delegitimize these practices as aberrant and illegal. 1

Introduction
Each of the chapters in this volume address different aspects of the same basic puzzle: what is the
relationship between “religious establishment” and the closely related category of “religious
freedom”? Conventional wisdom has it that the former is a contingent political issue addressed
to the relationship between religion(s) and the State, while the latter is a universal moral issue
addressed to the relationship between individual rights-bearers and the State. As understood in
Anglo-American legal history, establishment or non-establishment are merely the particular
forms of institutional relation that developed between England and the newly-separated English
church in the mid-sixteenth century and between the newly-independent United States and a
* I wish to thank Waheeda Amien, Saba Mahmood, and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan for comments and suggestions as well as
the participants in my South African Constitutional Law and Comparative Public Policy and Law Reform seminars for
helpful discussions on the Muslim Marriages Bill.
1. Ebrahim Moosa, “Tensions in legal and religious values in the 1996 South African Constitution,” in Beyond Rights Talk
and Culture Talk: Comparative Essays on the Politics of Rights and Culture , ed. Mahmood Mamdani (New York: St.
Martin’s, 2000), 133.

variety of religious arrangements, including state establishments, in the former colonies in the
late eighteenth century. We can thus speak today of an “established church” or “official or
dominant religion” as an enduring feature of modern national constitutions. But beyond the
culturally and historically limited category of “establishment,” we can also see today a
tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the world prescribing different forms of
relation between the State and religion(s). 2 This includes a variety of forms of recognition of and
formal relation to both majority and minority religions. 3
The distinction between religion-state relations, on the one hand, and the right to religious
freedom, on the other, allows us to see that there is no intrinsic or necessary correlation between
the degree of “establishment” and the protection accorded to religious liberty. The United
Kingdom, for example, has an established church, but at the same time accords robust legal
protection to the individual right of religious freedom, while China has an avowedly secular
public sphere but comparatively weak legal protection of the right. 4
There are, however, at least two apparently intrinsic connections between the categories
of establishment and right/freedom. The first is that these categories rest on an underlying
assumption of secularism or “the secular.”

Whether and to what extent a religion is

2. On relations between religion and State in various national constitutions, see Peter G. Danchin, “Of Prophets and
Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 49
(2008): 249, 297-307.
3. Spain and Italy, for example, have established “concordat” systems of recognition that provide different rights and
privileges to religious communities which are characterized by the use of negotiated agreements between the State and
federations of religious institutions often formed for the purpose of concluding and administrating the agreements. See
Gloria M. Morán, “The Spanish System of Church and State,” Brigham Young University Law Review (1995): 544; Silvio
Ferrari, “The Emerging Pattern of Church and State in Western Europe: The Italian Model,” Brigham Young University Law
Review (1995): 428-29.
4. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., “Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework,” in Religious Human Rights in
Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives, eds Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law
International, 1996), 1-44.

“established,” and where and how to demarcate the lines between religion and politics, are
ultimately questions for the state to decide. This is the defining feature, indeed essential paradox,
of modern secularism. 5 The second is that, while there may be no necessary correlation between
establishment and the right to religious freedom, where the right is recognized by the State, its
meaning and scope will be dynamically interrelated with the nature of the public sphere in a
particular society. This last point is a source of great confusion today. Contemporary religious
freedom discourse is shaped by two interrelated features: first, a conception of political authority
not in terms of any formal relation between the state and religion(s), but in terms of secular
neutrality, and second, a conception of the right in terms of freedom. The discourse is able to
maintain its simultaneous, and ultimately paradoxical, claims to uniqueness (because neutral
towards religion) and universality (because securing the right to freedom of religion) by defining
each concept in terms of the other. The constantly oscillating dialectic between neutrality and
freedom ensures that the nature of the public sphere is dynamically related to the scope of the
right to religious freedom. 6
What this conceptual structure means is that the political nature of the public sphere (i.e.
the relation of actually existing religions and religious communities to the state) is in practice
understood and configured in terms of a moral theory of individual rights (i.e. the relation of
rights-bearers as legal subjects to the State). Conversely, the actual meaning accorded to the
right to religious liberty in any particular case or controversy is in practice understood and
configured in terms of the political nature of the public sphere. In this way, what was first a

5.Thus even the case of a constitutional provision such as Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution which provides that “Islam
is the religion of the State and shari’a is the main source of legislation” reflects the extent to which Egypt is embedded
within the problem-space of modern secular power. See Hussein Agrama, Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and
the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
6. See Peter G. Danchin, “Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights,” Michigan Journal of
International Law 32 (2011): 663.

political question becomes a moral question, and what was first a moral question becomes
transformed into a political question. Both nomos (the public sphere) and logos (the right) are
ineliminably contextual and interconnected. Any account of nomian neutrality will quickly
devolve into hypostasis or reification of an historically specific political order and thus a
particular definition of “religion and belief” and specific form of demarcation between “public
and private” spheres. Any account of the right, when viewed historically, will reveal that rival
intellectual traditions and normative dissonances and conflicts are internal to the right itself. The
right, in other words, is simultaneously historically relative and normatively plural.
The thesis of this chapter is that the category of “religious establishment” has been
gradually transformed in modern liberal secular discourse into the category of moral right—the
right to religious liberty.

What today is viewed as “established” is not actually existing,

politically negotiated relations between the State and particular religious communities or
institutions (e.g. “the church,”), but rather the legal category of “right.” Legal and religious
obligations are re-described as rights of the subject in order to protect a normative conception of
freedom. As legal subjects religious individuals and groups thus assert claims of right which the
state must then decide through legislation or adjudication to recognize or restrict. This makes
contestation over rights claims an increasingly political process and further increases the power
of the state.
Two key issues remain: first, who is the proper subject of the right? Are only individual
persons, or may religious groups, communities, and institutions also properly be regarded as
entitled to claim the right to religious freedom? Second, what is the scope and meaning of the
right? Does it encompass merely a right to non-interference in the so-called “private sphere”
(and, if so, non-interference into what exactly?), or does it extend to various forms of public
recognition and accommodation by the State (and, if so, to which claims and religious practices
exactly and with what legal effect)?

This chapter explores the normative dissonances and antinomies generated by the politics
around religious establishment by examining post-apartheid law reform efforts in South Africa to
recognize Muslim marriages. Since the late 1990s, the South African Law Reform Commission
(SALRC) has initiated various projects to recognize the claims of and redress past discrimination
against different religious communities, including tribal groups living under customary law and
religious minorities with their own family and personal status laws. It is striking how the norms
and assumptions underpinning this debate differ from engagements involving the claims of
religious communities in Europe and North America today where broadly Protestant genealogies
of the right to freedom of conscience have become naturalized. The value-pluralist nature of the
post-apartheid constitutional order is transforming the politics between religious communities
and opening new spaces for legal and social reform. We are thus seeing new and intense debates
on questions of legal pluralism and the tensions between individual and group rights and
identities. This dynamic provides important insights into the meaning and scope of religious
freedom as a human right.
After a brief overview of the history of Muslim communities in South Africa and the
reasons for the non-recognition of Muslim marriages, I describe the efforts undertaken by the
SALRC to prepare a draft bill recognizing Muslim marriages as a matter of state law and the
politics which has subsequently emerged around competing claims to and understandings of
recognition of Muslim personal law (MPL), and I offer reflections on the reasons for and
implications of these antinomies and divergences. The law reform efforts in South Africa have
exposed critical ambivalences and normative resistance to the two great transformations which
together define the modern politics of religious freedom: the first relating to the emergence of a
“secular” public realm imagined to be independent of and in some new relation to “religion,”
now viewed as solely a matter for private life (the so-called public/private divide), and the second
relating to the redefinition of religion itself as conscience or belief in an age of what we might

term secular equality where the unstable convergence between conscience and autonomy has
gradually reversed in the secular imaginary such that religious liberty is today viewed as
autonomy.

History of Muslim Communities in South Africa
There have been Muslim communities in southern Africa for more than 300 years. 7

The

heterogeneity of these groups is a product of the history of settlement and colonialism in southern
Africa from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Malay Muslims first came to the
Cape as servants of the Dutch as early as 1658. Southeast Asian Muslims came as political
prisoners, convicts, and slaves starting in 1667, and Indian Muslims began arriving in the mid1850s, first as indentured laborers imported to work on British sugar plantations in Natal and
later voluntarily. 8 Today, these communities are the largest religious minority in the country,
comprising approximately 1.5 percent of the total population. 9
State recognition of Islamic law and the organization of Muslim legal affairs generally
was limited during this the first couple of centuries, and the extent to which Muslims in the Cape
resorted to the official (secular) courts in matters of family law and succession is unclear. 10 What
is known is that, following the founding of the first mosque in the Cape around 1805, imams
7. Ebrahim Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa: A History and Recent Developments,” Yearbook of Islamic
and Middle Eastern Law 3 (1996): 130.
8. Through conversion these communities also include members of the indigenous African and European (white)
communities. See Waheeda Amien, “Overcoming the Conflict between the Right to Freedom of Religion and Women’s
Rights to Equality: A South African Case Study of Muslim Marriages,” Human Rights Quarterly 28 (2006): 731; Moosa,
“Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 131.
9. Amien, 730.
10. With the advent of the Dutch East India Company between 1652 and 1795, the Commander’s Court accorded limited
recognition of Islamic law to “non-slave Moslems with regard to matters of family law and succession,” but otherwise “all
inhabitants, regardless of colour or status, came under Roman-Dutch law and such statutes as were of local operation.”
Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 132.

began to assert authority over family law matters and by the early nineteenth century “some form
of community judicial structures were in place which dealt with religious matters of a legal
nature.” 11
In the early twentieth century, the practice of Muslim personal law over matters of
marriage, divorce, custody, and succession began to be administered judicially and socially by
Ulama Councils (Muslim clergy). 12 By 1935 the Jamiatul Ulama of Transvaal was established,
the Muslim Judicial Council followed in 1945, and the Jamiatul Ulama of Natal was founded in
1955. Subsequently other ulama bodies emerged including the Majlis Ashura al-Islami in 1969,
the Islamic Council of South Africa in 1975, the Sunni Jamiatul Ulama of South Africa in 1978,
the Majlisul Ulama in 1976, and the Sunni Ulama Council in 1994. 13 The state, however,
consistently refused to recognize Muslim personal law, and thus Muslim marriages contracted
according to Islamic law were not recognized, causing hardship and injustice to Muslim
communities, especially women and children.
The doctrinal rational for non-recognition was stated as early as 1860 when the Cape
Supreme Court refused to recognize an applicant as a legitimate child on the grounds that a
Muslim marriage was “recognized concubinage” because potentially polygynous and thus
contrary to public policy. 14 This rationale remained in effect in South African law to the present
day. As recently as 1983, the Appellate Division reaffirmed that an Islamic marriage was contra

11. While from the 1860s to 1900 many cases involving disputes over mosque leadership and property disputes were taken
to the Cape Supreme Court, “very few cases of divorce, custody and succession were reported to have reached the secular
courts and there is every reason to believe that the community organs had successfully handled these.” Ibid., 133-134.
12. The ulama provided religious services at mosques, instructed children and adults about religious doctrine, and applied
“informal” personal law in the community. Ibid., 134.
13. Ibid.
14. Bronn v. Frits Bronn’s Executors (1860) 3 Searle 313 at 318. In Seedat’s Executors v. The Master 1917 AD 302, the
Court refused to recognize a Muslim widow as the surviving spouse for the purposes of the Natal Act which would have
exempted her from estate duty.

bona mores, i.e. “contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are regarded as morally
binding upon all members of our society.” 15
This close nexus between monogamy and “civilized” marriage can be traced to the
complex entanglement of Christian norms and doctrine within South African law and culture. In
the 1860 Bronn case, for example, the Cape Supreme Court stated that
. . . marriage is a condition Divine in its institution … and it is only by the
development of Christianity that the sacred and mysterious union has been clearly
revealed to mankind, and has enjoined a strict observance of its requirements, and one
of the first of these requirements is, amongst all Christian nations, that polygamy is
unlawful, and that marriage is only good when contracted with a man who is not
already married to another woman. 16

This statement offers a classical legal conception of marriage as status—universal and
fundamental to civilization and to law. 17 As Janet Halley has observed, marriage as status is still
today understood as “an institution, public not private, controlled by the will of the state, not that
of the parties.” 18
The effect of this law was essentially threefold: first, South African Muslims as a
community were discriminated against on the basis of their religion and treated as second-class
citizens; second, Muslim personal law evolved and was applied by ulama bodies in isolation
from both the obligations and rights accorded by state law; and third, unjust consequences
resulted for Muslims who were denied legislative rights and benefits available to marriages
recognized by civil law. A Muslim wife therefore could be unable to enforce her right to mahr
15. Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (AD) at 1026. The Court stated that potential polygyny is tantamount to actual
polygyny and any agreement (tacit or otherwise) between the parties cannot alter this.
16. Bronn (1860) 3 Searle 313 at 318. In Seedat’s Executors v. The Master 1917 AD 302, at 307-308, the Appellate
Division confirmed that polygamy is “reprobated by the majority of civilized peoples, on grounds of morality and religion.”
See Amien, 733.
17. Janet Halley, “What is Family Law? A Genealogy: Part I,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 23 (2011): 1-109.
18. Janet Halley, “Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage System,” Unbound 6 (2010): 4.

(dower) due to strict interpretations of shari’a by the ulama in her community, while at the same
time being unable to enforce a claim for maintenance under civil law due to non-recognition of
her Muslim marriage.
While some of the more deleterious effects of these judgments have begun to be
ameliorated by courts in the post-apartheid era, 19 and while judges have begun to recognize
certain aspects of Muslim personal law in the form of civil contracts, 20 Muslim marriages remain
unrecognized and thus potentially illegal as a matter of South African law.

It was this

unsatisfactory situation that led to the establishment of a Project Committee of the SALRC in
1999, which started an investigation into Islamic Marriages and Related Matters. 21

Legal Recognition of Muslim Marriages
Section 15 and the Right to Freedom of Religion and Belief
Section 15 of the 1996 Bill of Rights introduced the following provision into South African
constitutional law:
Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.
This section does not prevent legislation recognising
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or
family law; or
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons
professing a particular religion. 22
19. See Ryland v. Erdos, 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C); Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 1998 (4) SA 753 (CC).
20. Following Ryland and Amod, the proven terms of a civil contract such as “the husband’s unilateral duty of support, his
obligation to nafaqah (maintain) his wife during marriage and iddah, and payment of mahr, are legally enforceable.”
Amien, 736.
21. South African Law Reform Commission, Project 59: Islamic Marriages and Related Matters, Report, July 2003, 1-2.
22. S. Afr. Const. 1996 ss. 15(1) & (3)(a). Section 15(3)(b) also stipulates that “[r]ecognition in terms of paragraph [3](a)
must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution.” In addition to Section 15, Section 31 of
the Constitution provides that “[p]ersons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the

The distinctive normative structure of Section 15 is instructive. The subject of the right is said to
be “everyone” (presumably every “person”) while the scope of the right is said to extend to
“freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.” It is not clear on its face whether
this includes marriages concluded under systems of personal or religious law or the systems of
personal or family law “adhered to by persons professing a particular religion” themselves.
Section 15(3) simply states that “[t]his section does not prevent legislation recognising” such
marriages or systems of personal or family law, with the proviso set out in Section 15(3)(b) that
any such legislative recognition “must be consistent with this section [i.e. the right in Section
15(1)] and the other provisions of the Constitution.”
How should we interpret these provisions? Clearly Section 15(3) both anticipates and
authorizes forms of legal relation between the State and South Africa’s different religious
communities, including groups living under customary law and religious minorities with their
own family and personal status laws. Indeed, Section 15 expressly states that the right to
religious freedom itself as embedded in the new Bill of Rights cannot be read to prevent the legal
recognition of such religious practices and institutions (e.g. Muslim marriages) or systems of law
(e.g. Muslim personal status law).

In contrast to the Establishment Clause in the First

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution providing that “Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion,” Section 15 says that the national government may not prevent laws
establishing forms of recognition of religion and religious doctrine and practice.
Given that the title of Section 15 is Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion, it is clear
that the prohibition in Section 15(3) expresses an important aspect of this freedom. The category
of religious establishment is employed here to define and protect a particular normative
right, with other members of that community (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language.”
Section 235 further provides that the “right of South African people as a whole to self-determination … does not preclude …
recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language
heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.”

conception of freedom while the category of right is identified as a potential limitation on that
conception. Courts and legislatures are instructed by the Bill of Rights to read Sections 15(1) and
15(3) together, i.e. as entrenching a conception of the right that both allows space for and
accommodates diverse forms of both collective religious practice and identity as well as non-state
systems of personal or religious law. Any resulting recognition or accommodation, however,
cannot be inconsistent with the right to religious freedom itself in Section 15(1) or any other
fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to equality in Section 9.
The political questions of non-interference in or recognition by the State of religious
norms and practices are ultimately held to be subject to the normative (moral) constraints of the
right. At the same time, the subject and scope of the right are each ambiguous, allowing space
for forms of (political) contestation and recognition of religious norms, identities, and practices.
The question then becomes how these obvious antinomies and contradictions on issues of legal
establishment, freedom and pluralism, and individual and group rights and identities are to be
navigated and, if only provisionally, resolved.

The Recognition of Muslim Marriages Bill
In July 2003 the SALRC released its report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters, including
a draft of the Muslim Marriages Bill. The basic structure and purpose of the Bill was to make
provision for the recognition of existing Muslim marriages (whether monogamous or
polygynous) as well as existing civil marriages to a second wife. 23

The Bill specifies the

requirements of a valid Muslim marriage and provides for registration of such marriages. 24 It
further specifies that the proprietary consequences of Muslim marriages will be automatically out
of community of property, unless the parties agree otherwise by registered antenuptial

23. Section 5 (Requirements for validity).
24. Section 6 (Registration).

agreement. 25 In relation to termination of Muslim marriages, the Bill specifies that this can be by
faskh (dissolution by a court on the application of the wife), talaq (right of the husband to
terminate), or khula (dissolution at the instance of the wife), but the consequences of such
termination have to be confirmed by a court. 26 The Bill also contains further provisions dealing
with custody and maintenance. 27 It is interesting to note that the Bill does not provide for
independent shari’a courts, but rather seeks to implement Muslim Personal Law in the existing
court system with the requirement that a Muslim judge or advocate and two Muslim assessors be
appointed to assist the court. 28 Court decisions are then subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal with the proviso that decisions are submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions for
written comment on questions of law only. 29
Waheeda Amien has described the two main benefits of the Bill as allowing Muslim
parties to enjoy similar civil benefits as afforded to legal spouses while also allowing women to
enjoy the positive benefits of a Muslim marriage. This includes the provisions which (1) oblige
parties to provide for mahr; (2) recognize the husband’s unilateral obligation to maintain his
children and wife during the marriage and iddah; (3) oblige the husband in cases of divorce to
provide a separate residence for the wife when she has custody of the children; (4) entitle the
wife to be separately remunerated for breast-feeding purposes for two years from the birth of the
child; (5) enable the court to make an equitable division of assets where a party has assisted in the

25. Section 8 (Proprietary consequences and contractual capacity of spouses). Section 8 contains further provisions (subsections (4)-(10)) dealing with the equitable regulation of the proprietary consequences of polygynous marriages. For
further discussion, see Part IV.D.
26. Section 9 (Termination).
27. Section 11 (Custody of and access to minor children); section 12 (Maintenance). The Bill ensures legal recognition of
spouses married according to Islamic law by further calling for amendments to the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, the
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990.
28. Section 15(1)(a) and (b).
29. Section 15(4). For further discussion, see Part IV.C.

family business or contributed to the estate; (6) enable a surviving spouse to lodge a claim against
her deceased husband’s estate for unpaid mahr and any contribution recognized by shari’a that
she makes to his estate; (7) provide a minimum marriageable age of 18 years applicable to both
parties; (8) recognize different forms of divorce available to women such as faskh, khula, and
talaq, rather than simply talaq as the exclusive domain of the husband; and (9) recognize
polygyny, but only in a limited form regulated to protect the interests of women. 30
The negative aspects of the Bill from Amien’s perspective include (1) the traditional
Muslim approach to matrimonial property in the form of an out of community of property regime
(although with an opt-out provision); (2) the fact that husband and wife are equal in human
dignity, status, and capacity, but are not equal in rights (e.g. the husband only is allowed to take
multiple wives and the wife is under a unilateral obligation to observe iddah); (3) the exclusive
right of men to unilaterally repudiate the marriage (talaq); and (4) the placing of interpretation
and implementation of these provisions in the hands of Muslim judges and assessors required to
have “specialized knowledge of Islamic law” which makes the Bill susceptible to conservative
interpretations of shari’a. 31
In order to see what is at stake in these competing positions, let us turn to consider the
politics surrounding these issues which has evolved during the law reform process.

The Politics of Religious Establishment
As early as 1975, efforts were made to begin recognizing certain aspects of the legal
consequences of Muslim marriages in South African law. The main supporters of these early
initiatives were the established ulama groups. Others opposed these efforts as they suspected
they “had more to do with the attempt to purchase legitimacy for the disgraced tricameral

30. Amien, 743-44.
31. Ibid., 745-46.

parliament following the resistance that many Muslim groups offered the National Party
government.” 32 As Moosa acutely observes, Muslim responses to the overtures made by the
apartheid state reverberated in “several registers of discourse” at the same time, and in them “one
can discern the texture of colonial and racial discourses which run concurrently with the variety
of Muslim discourses.” These multiple discourses were “fractured and incomplete” and enfolded
within themselves “conflicting and subterranean discourses,” with the result that “discrimination,
resistance, religion and culture to mention a few issues, appear as moving categories whose
political saliences shift in relation to one another.” 33 In the turbulent politics of the 1980s, the
strongest resistance to SALC reform initiatives came from Muslim youth activists and students
who “suspected that the state with its array of intelligence and security networks in collaboration
with quietest and reactionary Muslim elements were planning to neutralize the Muslim
community with MPL.” 34
In response to the post-apartheid law reform proposals, it is possible to identify four
distinct yet deeply entangled normative positions staked out by the various groups (both Muslim
and non-Muslim) supporting or opposing legal recognition of Muslim marriages. Let us consider
each of these before turning to address the justifications and practical implications of each
position.

Four Perspectives and Reactions to the Bill
Support for the Bill has come from two camps.

First are human rights organizations and

activists, including “secular” Muslim groups and politically liberal organizations as well as the

32. Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 135-137.
33. Ibid., 136.
34. Ibid., 138. Consistent with policies regularly employed by the apartheid state, “[s]tate propagandists continuously
distinguished between the ‘good’ subject and the ‘bad’ subject, counterposing them as ‘peace-loving’ versus ‘radical’
Muslims and Christian clergy and their followers.”

SALRC which together support legal recognition as a means to remedy the history of injustice,
prejudice, and discrimination in South Africa against Muslims. The Bill, it is argued, would
bring South African law more in line with the values of freedom, equality, and pluralism
enshrined in the new constitutional order and, despite inevitable and legitimate challenges on
grounds of gender equality, will provide more protection for the rights of Muslim women than
the status quo. In line with contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, this is a position grounded
in notions, not of formal, but substantive equality.
The second camp are so-called “progressive” ulama and other Muslim civil society
organizations, which recognize the social and political reality of Muslims as a religious minority
in the new constitutional order, and see the Bill as a reasonable way to protect Islamic values and
norms by incorporating Muslim personal law into South African law and seeking a balance and
compromise with constitutional rights and imperatives. Despite opening Muslim personal law to
state regulation, these groups argue that legal recognition will paradoxically provide Muslims
input and a degree of influence over any state interference while simultaneously elevating
Muslim personal law to a more equal status in the public sphere, thus remedying both
symbolically and substantively the historical mistreatment of Muslims as second-class citizens.
Opposition to the Bill has also fallen into two broad camps. First are the more stridently
secularist and comprehensively “liberal” groups, who oppose the Bill as excessively entangling
the State with questions of Islamic law and unconstitutionally enacting regressive and
discriminatory Islamic norms and practices into state law. Prominent women’s rights activists
have thus argued that the drafting process was “manipulated to appease the Muslim clergy” and
that, if enacted, the Constitutional Court will need to decide “how to deal with the conflict
between the right to freedom of religion and women’s rights to equality.” 35 Excessive
entanglement, however, also includes concerns about religious freedom.

35. Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 146.

For constitutional

lawyers such Ziyad Motala, the draft Bill is thus “an unwise, improvident and questionable
constitutional exercise.” 36 Religion is a matter of voluntary choice, and the State should not
transgress into the sphere of private belief or interfere with the autonomy of religious institutions.
Conversely, the State should not endorse or become entangled in matters of religion, and the right
to religious liberty should be understood as protecting inner conscience, belief, or opinion, not
religious conduct falling into the sphere of legitimate legal jurisdiction. This kind of negotiated
and contingent modus vivendi is dangerous for both the State and religion—which should be kept
separate.
Paradoxically many of these concerns mirror those voiced by the second major opposition
camp comprised of the more traditional ulama bodies and “conservative” Islamic organizations.
These groups have opposed state regulation of Muslim personal law by a non-Islamic state and
have argued for maintenance of the status quo where ulama institutions and officials both
interpret and administer Muslim personal law within their communities. Indeed, the notion of
legal recognition has been argued to be against shari’a as it risks state interference with basic
tenets of Islamic law precisely on the basis of the new constitutional values of freedom, equality,
and pluralism. For this reason some of these groups have advocated for full exemption of
“Muslim family law legislation from the human rights provisions of the new constitution, arguing
that these values conflicted with their version of Islamic law.” 37
It is striking to observe how the main fault-lines of disagreement correspond to the two
issues discussed at the beginning of this chapter, religious establishment in the public sphere
(nomos) and the right to religious freedom (logos), and the paradoxical ways in which each
category is contested and defined in terms of the other. Thus both camps opposing the Bill can
be seen to be resisting the interrelation of this dialectic. The traditional ulama bodies seek robust
36

Ziyad Motala, “The Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: an unwise, improvident and questionable

constitutional exercise,” Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa XXXVII (2004): 328.
37. Moosa, “Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa,” 139.

recognition from the State as collective legal subjects with a broad right to non-interference
(liberty). Their co-oppositionists oppose the Bill paradoxically for exactly the opposite reason:
they seek to deny any broad notion of a group right to religious freedom and argue instead for a
more substantively “secular” account of the public sphere premised on a narrower conception of
individual right. This still entangles the State in concerns of “religion,” but now only in relation
to a significantly narrower conception of individual “conscience,” “belief,” and (private)
“practice.” This normative conception both requires a redefinition of what constitutes religion
and a proper religious subjectivity38 and at the same time empowers the State to intervene more
aggressively for regulatory purposes in any communal, traditional, customary, or religious
spheres of life currently under non-state forms of authority. Indeed, the very purpose and
rationality of such regulation is to “liberate” individuals from oppression or backwardness of
traditional forms of authority. On this view it would be preferable for Muslim personal law
ultimately to wither way as an anachronism or greatly be reduced in its scope and social power
by being replaced with a system of uniform civil law. 39
We see a mirror opposite in the camps supporting the Bill. Like the traditional ulama
bodies, political, liberal, and secular Muslim groups argue for a broad collective right to religious
freedom, but not for the purposes of non-interference. What they seek is public recognition. The
public sphere should be open to and engage with different collective religious identities and
norms, but should be subject to the overriding secular discipline and normative constraints of the
38. Saba Mahmood notes that “contrary to the ideological self-understanding of secularism (as the doctrinal separation of
religion and state), secularism has historically entailed the regulation and reformation of religious beliefs, doctrines, and
practices to yield a particular normative conception of religion (that is largely Protestant Christian in its contours) and that
“[h]istorically speaking, the secular state has not simply cordoned off religion from its regulatory ambitions but sought to
remake it through the agency of the law.” “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?” in Is
Critique Secular: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech (Berkeley, CA: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009), 85-86.
39. See Susan Moller Okin in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, eds Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C.
Nussbaum (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 22-23.

Constitution itself. From an opposite vantage point, moderate ulama and “progressive” Muslim
civil society groups argue similarly for public recognition, engagement, and access to justice, but
subject to the normative demand of reasonable accommodation by the State of Islamic norms and
practices.
What makes consideration of these issues so difficult and divisive is that these four
positions are often run seamlessly together, confused by proponents and opponents alike, or are
considered in isolation from each other.

We can see, for example, how supporters of the

recognition of Muslim personal law, especially those within Muslim communities, are concerned
not only with the right to freedom of religion or belief, but also with issues of women’s rights and
gender equality (especially as these rights have historically been violated by state action.)
Polemical portrayals of the patriarchal nature of Islam and of aggressive Islamist politics in the
public sphere and the framing by Muslim leaders of their claims in the name of religion and
religious freedom only combine to obscure this more subtle dialectic. Conversely we can see
how the arguments of secular opponents of recognition implicate not only on issues of gender
equality, but also the scope and meaning of the right to religious freedom. Critical judgments
made by law reformers and rights activists regarding the justice of Islamic norms on the grounds
of divergence from assumptions internal to liberal theory obscure the degree to which these
claims rest on contingent and contested accounts of the right to freedom of religion or belief
itself.
In this type of situation then, where a minority asserts claims of right against the majority
while at the same time asserting the legitimacy of certain internal communal restrictions, we face
a far more complex and multifaceted dialectic than is often supposed. Such situations compel us
to take seriously the plurality of whole ways of life complete with their associated conflicting
moralities and often exclusionary allegiances. This, in turn, requires us to confront conceptions of
the good that resist legal privatization and relegation to the private sphere of voluntary

association which is their fate under the neutrality of the liberal state. The type of modus vivendi
pluralism we see emerging in South African seeks a priori not to suppress or deny these types of
demands, but rather to create a diversity of jurisdictions or normative domains for the various
contending communities to reach (provisional) settlements.
This is a distinctly “mixed” conception of political order, with all the conflicts of
jurisdiction that such plural inheritances give rise to in the laws of marriage and the family, and
in this way it complicates the neat public/private divide imagined in liberal theory. It further
illustrates how the right to freedom of religion is not a singular notion, but rather a complicated
bundle of entitlements, each made up of a diversity of claims, and thus protects a range of human
interests that are often at odds. When conflicts arise, as they inevitably do, these can reasonably
be settled in different ways, making a general or universal theory impossible.

Legislative Recognition versus Judicial Adjudication
There are three further important implications that follow from this conception of the relationship
between religious establishment and religious freedom. The first is the important practical
difference between recognition via legislative reform as opposed to via judicial process and
adjudication. While both involve a conception of religious establishment in terms of religious
freedom, the mode and practical terms of engagement are quite different. The reform process
seeking legislation recognizing Muslim marriages is clearly not a concordat or formal legal
agreement between the State and a religious community. 40 It does, however, contain some
similarities. Since 1996 the SALRC has engaged in a far-reaching and ongoing process of
outreach, requests for submissions, hearings, and negotiation on reform proposals with South
Africa’s Muslim communities and ulama organizations. This has required the State to engage
directly with affected communities and thus with the conflicts and divergent politics that any

40. See note 3.

such engagement entails. For all its contradictions and perceived weaknesses, the 2003 Bill is a
reflection of this substantive political engagement.
It is instructive to compare this with the religious freedom jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court during the same time period. The Court has decided three major cases under
Article 15 since 1996. 41 Despite its rhetoric of religious pluralism, associational autonomy, and
reasonable accommodation, and despite the explicit collective rights provisions in the Bill of
Rights, the Court has decided each of these leading Section 15 cases in favor of restricting claims
to religious freedom and against challenges to unfair discrimination on the basis of religion. This
supports the contention that the moralizing politics of religious freedom diverge in important
respects from the messy politics of religious establishment as represented by the SALRC project
to recognize Muslim marriages.
The adjudication of rights claims assumes the form of a techne or technology of liberal
governance which, paradoxically, serves to increase the power of the State by restricting or
dismissing the claims to religious freedom and collective identity of actually existing religious
communities. This obscures the extent to which South African law and the public sphere remain
entangled both directly and indirectly with Christian norms, symbols, and practices, 42

and

illustrates how a majority of the Court has been willing to interpret the right to religious freedom
and the prohibition on unfair religious discrimination to give priority to the values of the majority
religious culture. 43

41. S. v. Lawrence; S. v. Negal; S. v. Solberg, 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC); Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of
Education, 2000 (4) SA 757; and Prince v. President, Cape Law Society, 2002 (2) SA 794.
42. See Jerry S. Ismail, “South Africa’s Sunday Law: Finding a Compromise,” Indiana International and Comparative Law
Review12 (2001): 563-86.
43. As discussed in Part II, the secular and religious spheres were intimately linked during the apartheid era, and issues such
as Sunday closing laws reflect this continuing entanglement. Christof Heyns and Danie Brand, “The Constitutional
Protection of Religious Human Rights in Southern Africa,” Emory International Law Review 14 (2000): 760-61.

Shari’a as Muslim personal law in the Spaces of Modern Secular Power
A second striking feature of the 2003 Bill is Section 15, which provides for disputes relating to
“the interpretation or application of any provision” to be referred to a court for adjudication, but
on the proviso that a “Muslim judge from that court” or, in the alternative, a senior “Muslim
advocate or attorney,” is appointed to hear the dispute at first instance. 44 The court is then to be
“assisted by two Muslim assessors who shall have specialized knowledge of Islamic law.” 45 Any
decision can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but the decision must also be
submitted to two accredited Muslim institutions “for written comment on questions of law only,”
which must be lodged within 60 days with the Registrar of the appeal court. 46
Here again we can see the various ways in which this mixed institutional arrangement
tracks the four dynamics discussed above. The courts may not apply a uniform civil law of
marriage to all spheres of social life, nor may they apply (even if it were possible) shari’a to the
exclusion of existing state law. The courts may further not deny recognition of Muslim personal
law as in the past, leaving the social practice and regulation of Muslim marriages to ulama
bodies. Rather the Bill requires the court to apply a statute that both recognizes and regulates
aspects of Muslim personal law. This hybrid normativity is reflected in both the procedural and
substantive structure of the court itself, which requires Muslim judges to interpret and apply both
Islamic law (as incorporated in the statute) and constitutional rights and values in relation to
Islamic norms and practices.
This dialogic and mediating conception of both law and the role of legal officials is also
apparent in the appeal structure. Final authority is vested in the Supreme Court of Appeal, which
has the power to overrule legal interpretations by Muslim judges assisted by two specialist
assessors (i.e. to overrule judgments concerning the proper relationship between different sources
44. Section 15(1)(a).
45. Section 15(1)(b).
46. Section 15(3) and (4).

and jurisprudential schools of both state and Islamic law). 47 But before doing so, the Court must
consider and expressly overrule the opinions of two ulama bodies. What Robert Cover once
termed the “jurispathic power” of the state—the state’s domination of autonomous paideic
communities under a unitary law—must in this way justify any coercive suppression of the
“fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle.” 48
This dialogic hybrid conception of adjudication sits uneasily between shari’a courts
presided over by qadis engaged in ijtihad, on the one hand, and secular courts enforcing Muslim
personal law norms as encoded into statutes, on the other. The question is how Islamic norms are
to be incorporated into state law and how legal officials are to interpret those norms once
codified. Certain Muslim legal scholars, for example, have criticized the definition of mahr in
the Bill, which they argue departs from classical Islamic law. 49

Similarly scholars have

47. It is instructive to compare South Africa and India on this issue. Parties to a Muslim marriage in South Africa are
required to opt-in to the provisions of the Act (section 2(1)), and the Supreme Court of Appeal retains final adjudicatory
authority regarding disputes (section 15(4)). In India, by contrast, the parties to a Muslim marriage must expressly opt-out
of relevant Muslim personal law provisions if they wish a dispute to be adjudicated according to uniform civil law (see the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986, sect. 5 and the Shariat Act of 1937, which provides that in all
matters of family, including divorce and maintenance, courts will decide such questions in the light of the Shariat).
Following Shah Bano, the Supreme Court of India has been cautious on the question of overriding Muslim personal law
provisions in favor of uniform civil or criminal laws.
48. Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” in Narrative Violence and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover, Martha Minow,
Michael Ryan, and Austin Sarat, eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 57.
49. Section 1 of the Bill states that mahr is payable by the husband to the wife “in order to establish a family and lay the
foundations for affection and companionship.” The Quranic definition, however, is as follows: “And give unto the women,
(on marriage) their dower as a free gift; but if they of their own accord remit unto you a part thereof, then you are welcome
to absorb it (unto your wealth).” Quran Chapter 4:4. As Agherdien observes, the Section 1 definition appears to imply
“some sort of obligation on the wife to use her mahr/dower to benefit the family unit,” whereas under the Quranic definition
“the wife has full control over her dower, with absolutely no strings attached” and is thus on the part of the husband “an
admission of the independence of the wife.” Wesahl Agherdien, “Muslim Personal Law in South Africa,” South African
Journal on Human Rights Conference, July 5-7, 2004, 18-19.

questioned how Muslim judges and assessors are to choose between and apply different schools
of Islamic jurisprudence in cases involving different claimants. 50 Finally, there is the question of
what “Islamic law” is exactly and how it is to be identified. 51
While these are complex and contested questions, they are the kinds of normative
dilemmas that a value pluralist theory of law both anticipates and celebrates. The logic of
Section 15 is that the very presence of Muslim judges and assessors on state courts combined
with the advisory role of ulama bodies has the potential to create dynamic opportunities for
interpretation and development of the law in dialogue between the courts and South Africa’s
Muslim communities. This is hoped to avoid the otherwise ossifying effects of shari’a being
codified into state law in the form of Muslim personal law. 52 Regardless of these jurisprudential
debates, this clearly represents a different normative conception of freedom, religion, community,
and the individual to that imagined in classical liberal theory with its rigid insistence on state
neutrality mediated by a scheme of individual rights.
Finally, the Bill reflects the extent to which shari’a today has taken on distinctly liberal
characteristics and sensibilities under the secular framework of the South African constitution. As
Saba Mahmood has suggested in the Egyptian context, shari’a has been fundamentally
transformed and now inhabits the spaces of personal status or religion-based family law under the
50. As observed again by Agherdien (ibid. 21):“The body of Muslim law used in South Africa dates back to the nineteenth
century Muslim law schools of the Middle East, namely the Hanafi and Shafi schools of jurisprudence. Thus, the present Bill
seems to be a hopscotch combination of those schools …. [and] remains silent on how it will deal with a conflict of schools.”
51. The 2010 version of the Bill includes a definition of Islamic law as “the law as derived from the Holy Qur’an, the
Sunnah (prophetic model), the consensus of Muslim Jurists (Isma), and analogical deductions based on the primary sources
(Qiyas).” For comments, see Waheeda Amien, “Politics of Religious Freedom in South Africa,” The Immanent Frame, 24
July 2012, available at: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/07/24/politics-of-religious-freedom-in-south-africa/ (accessed October
21, 2012).
52. The irony here being the recurrent caricature of Islamic law as “a stagnant entity and, hence, impervious to change.”
Ebrahim Moosa, “Colonialism and Islamic Law,” in Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates, eds Muhammad Khalid
Masud, Armando Salvatore, and Martin van Bruinessen (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 165.

regulatory discipline of the state, which grants religious groups certain juridical autonomy over
family affairs.
As we have seen, this dynamic is reflected in the fourth position responding to the Bill as the
traditional ulama bodies have resisted the proposed legislation on the grounds that Muslim
personal law comprises the core of Islamic tradition and identity. Again Section 15 seeks to
respond to these concerns by ensuring that both Muslim judges and ulama bodies are integrally
involved and consulted in any judicial changes to Muslim personal law. Section 13 further
requires compulsory mediation between the parties before an accredited Mediation Council prior
to adjudication. For the ulama this provision was seen as an important medium through which to
manage and resolve disputes regarding marriages and divorce outside of State courts and law.
The latest version of the Bill reflects the continuing anxiety and political tensions between
the four camps over these issues. Reflecting the concerns of its secular opponents, the 2010 Bill
now no longer contains Section 15 requiring a Muslim judge or the need for Muslim assessors,
and the requirement of binding mediation has been replaced with a proposal for voluntary
mediation. Reflecting the concerns of its ulama opponents, however, the Bill now contains an
explicit definition of the sources of Islamic law which is likely to limit the discretion of judges in
interpreting and changing Muslim personal law norms. 53

Family Law and Muslim Personal Law
A final striking aspect of the politics surrounding the Bill has been the question of the
relationship between “family law” and “Muslim personal law.” Criticisms of the Bill by gender
equality advocates have often been premised on the assumption that recognition of Muslim
personal law is antithetical to the guarantee of gender equality in family law. For example we
have seen how the Bill codifies the default position regarding the proprietary consequences of

53. For discussion, see footnote 51.

marriage in Islamic law by providing that, unless an ante-nuptial contract is entered into by the
spouses and registered, a “Muslim marriage to which this Act applies shall be deemed to be a
marriage out of community of property, excluding the accrual system.” 54 This differs from the
civil law position where the default rule is “in community of property.” 55 The Bill further
specifies that in registering a Muslim marriage the marriage officer must record “the dower
agreed to.” 56 The term “dower” or “mahr” is then defined as “the money, property or anything of
value, including benefits which must be payable by the husband to the wife as an ex lege
consequence of the marriage itself in order to establish a family and lay the foundations for
affection and companionship.” 57

These provisions have attracted criticism for codifying

discriminatory differences between men and women: the husband only is required to pay the
mahr and to maintain his wife both during and after the marriage; upon the dissolution of
marriage, the wife has property rights only out of community of property (without accrual), and
her right to maintenance is only for the period of iddah (three months). Such differences are
argued to violate the right to equality, and gender rights advocates have thus viewed this form of
legal recognition of Muslim personal law a priori as a threat to women’s rights.
While space precludes detailed consideration of these questions, there are a number of
reasons why such critiques rest on often problematic assumptions that serve to exacerbate rather
54. Section 8(1). Thus the spouses maintain their own estate, and any growth accrued during the marriage is not divided
between them. This is subject to Section 9(7)(b), which allows the court to make an order for the equitable division of assets
where a party has assisted in the operation of the family business or contributed to the maintenance or increase of the other’s
estate.
55. Marriage Act 25 of 1961.
56. Section 6(3)(c).
57. Section 1(vi). In relation to maintenance, the “husband is obliged to maintain his wife during the subsistence of a
Muslim marriage according to his means and her reasonable needs.” In the case of dissolution or divorce, “the husband is
obliged to maintain the wife for the mandatory waiting period of ‘Iddah’ and, if she has custody of minor children, “to
remunerate the wife, including providing a separate residence if the wife does not own a residence, for the period of such
custody only.” Section 12(2)(c)(i) and (ii).

than address the otherwise genuine concerns they raise. The first is what may be termed the
“incomplete secularization of family law” thesis. As Mahmood has suggested in the context of
postcolonial states in the Middle East, the “continuing persistence of religion-based family laws
… is often seen as a sign of the incomplete secularization of these societies and the failure of the
postcolonial state to draw a firewall separation between religion and the state.” 58 Viewed as an
outdated and pre-modern remnant, such religion-based family laws “are understood to exhibit an
ossified and recalcitrant quality that should have been remedied by the secularizing force of civil
law.” 59 But as many scholars have shown, this account fails to appreciate how “the telescoping
of religious law into the domain of the family is not so much a violation of secular principles as it
is the product of the simultaneous relegation of religion, family, and sexuality to the private
sphere under the regime of modern governance.” 60 The result of this privatization under the
modern power of political secularism is that
[f]amily law as a distinct legal domain is a modern invention that did not exist in its
present form in the premodern period. Classical sharia jurisprudence did not, for
example, entail a separate domain called ‘family law’ …. [and] what is now associated
with the core and essence of religion (Christian and Muslim alike), that is, personal
status or family law, is an amalgam constructed from a variety of customary and
religious jurisdictions that came to acquire an autonomous and distinct character in the
modern period. 61

Once this historical genealogy is recognized, the notion that complete secularization of religionbased systems of family law will lead to increased gender equality becomes inherently
problematic. Indeed, as the family has become “a key site of intervention for projects of social
reform undertaken by the state” in the modern period, this has in many cases served to increase
58. Mahmood, 57.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 58.
61. Ibid.

gender inequality, especially in relation to the institution of marriage. 62
Viewing family law and the institution of marriage as sites of inequality and
exceptionalism 63 can help us to see the extent to which the existing system of family law in South
Africa is deeply entangled with Protestant genealogies and understandings of the family. 64 The
extent to which marriage as an institution remains an established status that is implicated in the
functions of both social order and personal freedom generating its own inherent inequalities will
further be apparent. 65 Following Janet Halley this would suggest that we should pay more careful
attention to the marriage system as a whole—including its various “drop-off” and “formpluralism” elements—and the complex ways in which it paradoxically intertwines both status and
contract. 66 This would allow us critically to examine the multifaceted, exclusionary, and unequal
effects of the South African marriage system which now includes civil, common law, customary,
same-sex, domestic partnership, Muslim, and (currently under consideration) Hindu marriages.

Conclusion
The chapter has argued that the law reform effort to recognize Muslim marriages and Muslim
personal law more broadly in South Africa allows us to locate these dilemmas within the
62. Ibid. See Judith E. Tucker, Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
63. See Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich, “Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary
Studies if Family Law Exceptionalism,” American Journal of Comparative Law 58 (2010): 753-776.
64. See Mary Anne Case, “The Peculiar Stake U.S. Protestants Have in the Question of State Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages,” in After Secular Law, eds Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle, and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 302. Case notes in the U.S. context that there “is simply very little air between
marriage as the state defines it and marriage as Protestants can define it to their flock.”
65. See Halley, “What is Family Law?”. Carole Pateman argues that “the social contract presupposed the sexual contract,
and that civil freedom presupposed patriarchal right.” The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988), x.
66. Halley observes that “form-pluralistic systems have an ascriptive character …. [and] are less emphatic about choice,
more regulatory, more governmental in the Foucaultian sense than a real menu of options.” Ibid., 32.

problematic space of modern secular power and the various anxieties and contingencies this gives
rise to regarding the limits of liberal neutrality and liberal rights. In this respect South Africa’s
response to the claims of its Muslim communities sheds light on the two main dilemmas haunting
modern liberal accounts of the right to religious freedom. The first concerns the neutrality of the
public sphere and the insistence that religion is properly a matter for private life, where religious
faith, identity, and ritual are to be simultaneously contained and protected and excluded from
public life where rational secular discourse is similarly to be construed and secured. The second
concerns the universality of the right to religious freedom and its justification in liberal political
morality in terms of competing accounts of autonomy.
The South African case has been shown to complicate these narratives. It allows us to see
that the neutrality of the political order is always an abstract particularism comprising contingent
settlements and negotiated religion-state establishments. It further allows us to see how the
existing contours of the public sphere reflect the “private faith” of communities which have
historically embodied the Christian and European traditions of South Africa’s colonial past. If
correct, the challenge is not further to exclude the claims of religious communities, but to ensure
that the public sphere reflects and recognizes the diversity of South Africa’s actually existing
religious communities.
The South African case also allows us to see that the universality of the right to religious
freedom is always a concrete universal claiming normative authority. A value pluralist, groupdifferentiated account of freedom of religion or belief requires the state to recognize a limited
sphere of collective autonomy or nomian separation—a space for “associational self-realization
in nomian terms.” Such a Coverian view of normative and legal pluralism challenges the state’s
domination of autonomous communities under a unitary law and seeks for the polynomia of legal
meaning to be extended to the domain of social practice and control.

Thus rather than

circumscribing the nomos in a single, statist “Spartan eunomia,” it invites in new worlds in the

form of a complex nomos of “equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute
the array of commitments, realities, and visions extant at any given time.” 67 The old adage of
“one law for all and no exceptions” on this view gives way to “plural laws for different
communities with certain exceptions.”

67. Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” 57.

